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^ STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
NORTH ROSE-WOLCOTT CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT CASE NO. E-2134 
Upon the Application for Designation of 
Persons as Managerial or Confidential. 
BRENT D. COOLEY, for Employer 
CHAMBERLAIN, D'AMANDA, OPPENHEIMER & GREENFIELD (MICHAEL T. 
HARREN of counsel), for North Rose-Wolcott Service Employees 
Association 
CAROLYN SMITH, prose 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on exceptions filed by the North Rose-Wolcott Central 
School District (District) to the Administrative Law Judge's (ALJ) decision on an 
application to designate Carolyn Smith, a clerk/typist, as a confidential employee 
pursuant to §201.7(a) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act). 
The District created the clerk/typist position on August 11, 1998. Ms. Smith was 
appointed to the position effective October 26, 1998. The application to designate Ms. 
Smith as a confidential employee was opposed by the North Rose-Wolcott Central 
Service Employees Association (SEA). 
The District's Business Executive, Keith Henry, was its only witness. He testified 
about his responsibilities, which include discipline of the noninstructional staff, being a 
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member of the District's negotiating team for the SEA unit and with the union that 
represents the District's department heads. 
Henry described the various tasks Ms. Smith performed, such as copying and 
collating District proposals prior to negotiations. On occasion, she has retrieved 
personnel files to obtain information and opened maii that contained negotiation 
material or materials relating to an employee's discipline. 
The District has filed exceptions to the ALJ's decision dismissing the District's 
application. The District argues in its exceptions that there was sufficient evidence in 
the record to grant the application to designate Ms. Smith as confidential.1 
After reviewing the record and considering the parties' arguments, we affirm the 
ALJ's decision. 
In 1972,2 the Board expressed the policy underlying the 1971 amendment to the 
Act, to wit: "[l]t was not the intention of the. Legislature to increase substantially the 
1The District moved on October 6, 1999 to reopen the record to introduce 
evidence of Ms. Smith's duties of a confidential nature since the close of the hearing. 
By letter dated December 14, 1999, the District's motion was denied. The District 
moved on December 16, 1999 to reconsider the denial. The Association submitted an 
affirmation in opposition dated December 21, 1999. By letter dated December 22, 
1999, the District was notified that its motion would be reconsidered. The District's 
motion is denied. The evidence the District sought to present represented duties 
assigned after the close of the hearing. Margolin v. PERB, 130 A.D.2d 312, 20 PERB 
H7018 (3d Dep't 1987), appeal dismissed, 71 N.Y.2d 844, 21 PERB 1J7005 (1988). The 
denial of the District's motion is without prejudice to refile (consistent with the provisions 
of §201.10(b) of our Rules of Procedure) if the District considers the circumstances of 
Ms. Smith's employment to have changed. 
2State of New York, 5 PERB 1J3001, at 3004 (1972). 
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number of employees designed as managerial or confidential . . . . It [the Amendment] 
expressed a legislative caution to this Board that the statutory criteria should be applied 
conservatively in order to preserve existing negotiating units." 
This policy has been embodied in our decisions. We have held that an employee 
is confidential only when, in the course of assisting a managerial employee who 
exercises labor relations responsibilities, that employee has access to personnel/labor 
relations information on a regular, basis which is not appropriate for the eyes and ears 
of rank-and-file personnel or their negotiating representative.3 (emphasis added) 
Although Keith Henry was responsible for disciplining the District's noninstructional staff 
and was a member of the District's negotiating team which negotiates with the union 
representing its department heads, the ALJ did not decide the issue of Mr. Henry's 
managerial status, choosing instead to assume his managerial status for .the purposes 
of her analysis. Similarly, we need not decide that issue in order to make our 
determination. 
Mr. Henry testified that Ms. Smith was only occasionally asked to retrieve 
documents from personnel files or to open mail which might contain documents relating 
to personnel or labor negotiations. 
Most recently, we discussed the two-part test to be applied in determining 
whether a particular employee should be designated confidential.4 The first part of the 
3Penfield Cent. Sch. Dist, 14 PERB fi4044, aff'd,U PERB fl3082 (1981). 
4Town ofDeWitt, 32 PERB fl3001, at 3002 (1999). 
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test is duty oriented while the second is relationship oriented, and the two parts are 
distinct; satisfaction of one might not satisfy the other. 
Since not all personnel tasks will satisfy the first part of the test, it is only those 
personnel functions which present conflicts of interest with the employees' 
representation which qualify for confidential designation.5 Simple access to existing ' 
personnel information, as Ms. Smith had, is not sufficient because the testimony failed 
to establish that the information presented a conflict of interest or a clash of loyalties 
with Ms. Smith's representation for the purposes of collective negotiations. 
The relationship of Ms. Smith, to Mr. Henry also fails to satisfy the second part of 
the test. There is nothing in the record to establish that the position of clerk/typist is in a 
J .••• confidential relationship to the Business Executive. Ms. Smith was hired to share 
clerical assistance between the Business Office,and the Curriculum Coordinators. 
There was no evidence adduced, either testimonial or through a job description, that • 
elevated Ms. Smith's clerical assistance to Mr. Henry to a confidential ievei. 
We find that the District has failed to establish a confidential relationship between 
the clerical assistance Ms. Smith provided and Mr. Henry's managerial responsibilities. 
Based on the foregoing, we deny the District's exceptions and affirm the ALJ's 
decision. 
J 5/d.at3003. 
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IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the application must be, and it hereby is, 
dismissed. 
DATED: January 24, 2000 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
fare A. Abbott, Member 
1
 John T. Mitchell, Member 
) 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
SARA-ANN P. FEARON, 
Charging Party, 
- and - CASE NO. U-20760 
UNITED FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, 
Respondent, 
- and -
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY SCHOOL 
DISTRICT OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, 
Employer. 
SHELLMAN D. JOHNSON, for Charging Party 
JAMES R. SANDNER, GENERAL COUNSEL (MARIA ELENA GONZALEZ of 
counsel), for Respondent 
ROBERT E. WATERS, ESQ., for Employer 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions of Sara-Ann P. Fearon to the Director's 
decision of September 15,1999 which denied Ms. Fearon's motion to reopen the 
improper practice charge she filed against the United Federation of Teachers (UFT). 
The charge alleged a violation of §209-a.2(c) of the Public Employees' Fair 
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Employment Act (Act).1 Ms. Fearon charged that UFT failed in its duty to represent her 
during her grievance against her employer, the Board of Education of the City School 
District of the City of New York (District). 
During the processing of this charge, the parties reached a settlement which was 
embodied in a written agreement dated June 3, 1999. The agreement provided, 
among other things, that Ms. Fearon's grievance filed September 28, 1998 would be 
heard at Step II by the District's Assistant Superintendent. Furthermore, at paragraph 
"6" of the agreement, Ms. Fearon declared that she did not want UFT to represent her. 
She would argue her own case with the assistance of Ms. Hawkins.2 
On June 15, 1999, the Director informed the parties that he approved the 
request to withdraw the above matter. However, Ms. Fearon objected to the closure of 
this case, in a series of letters commencing on June 23, 1999, urging the Director to 
reopen the charge. Ms. Fearon sought to reopen the charge on the grounds that the 
UFT had repudiated the settlement agreement. 
By a decision dated September 15, 1999, the Director closed the matter. 
Ms. Fearon filed timely exceptions to his decision. Ms. Fearon excepts on various 
grounds, most notable of which to form the basis to reopen the charge are exceptions 
"3" and "4". 
1The District was made a statutory party pursuant to §209-a.3 of the Act. 
2Rivkah Hawkins is the UFT Chapter Chairperson who assisted Ms. Fearon at 
the Step II hearing. 
Board - U-20760 -3 
We have held that the Board's jurisdiction to prevent improper practices is limited 
by the statutory provision found in §205.5 (d) of the Act.3 We have, nevertheless, 
extended jurisdiction to contract disputes whenever one of the parties has repudiated 
the terms of an agreement.4 In this regard, the Board's jurisdiction has extended to 
collateral agreements as well as collectively negotiated contracts.5 
In order for us to find a repudiation of the settlement agreement of June 3, 1999, 
which would warrant a reopening of the improper practice charge, we must find upon 
this record a denial of the existence of a valid agreement or of a contractual obligation 
without any colorable claim of right to do so. 
For the reasons that follow, we affirm the Director's denial of the motion to 
reopen. This Board has permitted recission of the withdrawal of an improper practice 
charge in extremely rare and limited circumstances.6 This is in keeping with the interest 
in finality of settlement agreements. Consequently, a mere difference of opinion 
between the parties over the interpretation of a settlement agreement or a difference of 
3See Glens Falls PBA v PERB, 195 A.D.2d 933, 26 PERB fl7009 (3d Dep't 
1993); State of New York (Dep't of Taxation and Finance), 24 PERB P034 (1991). 
See also §205.5(d), of the Act which states, inter alia, "the Board shall not have 
authority to enforce an agreement between an employer and an employee organization 
and shall not exercise jurisdiction over an alleged violation of such an agreement that 
would not otherwise constitute an improper employer or employee organization 
practice..." 
4See Connetquot Cent. Sch. Dist, 21 PERB 1J3049 (1988). 
5Glens Falls PBA, supra. 
'New York State Pub. Employees Fed'n (Farkas), 15 PERB 1T3020 (1982). 
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opinion concerning the extent to which compliance has been achieved is insufficient to 
warrant the reopening of a settled improper practice charge.7 
Upon a review of the record, set forth in the Director's decision dated 
September 15, 1999, there appears to exist a difference of opinion as to the extent to 
which compliance with terms of the settlement agreement has been achieved. Ms. 
Fearon urges us in exception "3" that "UFT failed to perform paragraph "7" of the 
agreement..." Conversely, UFT points out in its response of August 23, 1999, that 
Rivkah Hawkins was the UFT representative at the Step II hearing. 
In exception "4", Ms. Fearon argues that "respondents clearly repudiated the 
settlement-agreement until June 21, 1999." By letter dated June 23, 1999 to the 
Director, Ms. Fearon wrote that she "proceeded pro se with Rivkah Hawkins P.S. 221 
local representative... It is the agreement I speak to and it has been breached." UFT 
has never denied the existence of the settlement agreement. In the August 23, 1999 
letter, UFT pointed out that Ms. Hawkins was present at the Step II hearing. Section 
205.5(d) of the Act and our decisions thereunder constrain us from exercising 
jurisdiction over a difference of opinion concerning whether and to what extent a 
settlement agreement has been performed. 
We hereby deny Ms. Fearon's exceptions and affirm the decision of the Director. 
7State of New York (State Univ. of New York - College at Potsdam), 22 PERB 
U3045 (1989); See also County of Suffolk, 22 PERB 1J3032 (1989). 
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IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the motion to reopen the charge herein be, 
and it hereby is, denied. 
DATED: January 24, 2000 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
arc A. Abbott, Member 
Jchn T. Mitchell, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
MARTIN FREEDMAN, 
Charging Party, 
- a n d - CASE NO. U-20764 
UNITED FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, 
Respondent, 
-and-
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY SCHOOL 
DISTRICT OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, 
Employer. 
MARTIN FREEDMAN, pro se 
JAMES R. SANDNER, GENERAL COUNSEL (RICHARD A. SHANE of 
counsel), for Respondent 
DALE C. KUTZBACH, DIRECTOR OF LABOR RELATIONS (ANGEL L. ORTIZ 
of counsel), for Employer 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions to a decision of the Director of Public 
Employment Practices and Representation (Director) denying Martin Freedman's 
motion to reopen an improper practice charge filed by him against the United 
Federation of Teachers (UFT), which had been withdrawn pursuant to an agreement 
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between the parties.1 The charge alleged a violation of §209-a.2(a), (b) and (c) of the 
Act by UFT when it failed to represent him in numerous grievances about the District's 
failure to place him in specific elementary schools in a position within his license area. 
During the processing of Freedman's charge, Freedman, the UFT and the 
District entered into an agreement in settlement of the improper practice charge.2 
Pursuant to the terms of the settlement agreement, Freedman withdrew the charge and 
the withdrawal was approved by the Director on June 15, 1999. On July 23, 1999, 
Freedman wrote that he had satisfied the terms of the agreement but that the District 
had not and that unless he was "offered a position I will consider this Agreement to be 
null and void and will reopen my improper practice charge."3 
1Freedman's employer, the Board of Education of the City School District of the 
City of New York (District), was made a statutory party pursuant to §209-a.3 of the 
Public Employees'Fair Employment Act (Act). 
2!n relevant part, the agreement provided that the UFT would assist Freedman in 
obtaining a Restoration of Health (ROH) leave of absence for the 199.8-1999 school 
year. Freedman was to submit the Confidential Medical Application to the District and 
cooperate with requests for medical information in order to process his request for ROH 
leave for the 1998-1999 school year. Upon resolution of Freedman's leave status and 
as long as the District did not determine that Freedman was unfit for teaching, the 
District agreed to offer to Freedman the next available position in certain specified 
schools within the District in Kindergarten through sixth grades for the 1999-2000 
school year, after it had satisfied its contractual obligations to other teachers and with 
attention paid to Freedman's preference for a position in either the fourth, fifth or sixth 
grades. 
3The District wrote to Freedman on August 9, 1999, pointing out to him that he 
had not yet been examined by the Medical Bureau, pursuant to District procedure and 
the terms of the settlement agreement. Once he had fulfilled that requirement, the 
District indicated that it would comply with the remainder of the terms of the settlement 
agreement. 
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Both the UFT and the District objected to the reopening of the charge. The UFT 
argued that Freedman was not seeking to reopen his charge, only that he indicated a 
predisposition to do so if he was not offered a position for the 1999-2000 school year. 
Further, the UFT argued that Freedman had not alleged that a position which met the 
requirements of the settlement agreement was available for the 1999-2000 school year. 
The District also opposed reopening the case, alleging that while Freedman had been 
approved for his ROH leave, he had not yet been approved by the District's Medical 
Bureau to return to teaching. Freedman responded that he is fit for duty because his 
confidential medical report indicated that he did not need a prior recommendation from 
the Medical Bureau to return to work. 
By letter decision dated September 24, 1999, the Director determined that the 
correspondence submitted to him evidenced nothing more than a difference of opinion 
as to whether the settlement agreement had been complied with by the parties: Noting 
that an improper practice charge will not be reopened when the basis for the motion to 
reopen is a difference of opinion about compliance with the settlement agreement 
which withdrew the charge, the Director denied the motion to reopen. 
Thereafter, Freedman filed exceptions to the Director's decision, arguing that 
because the Confidential Medical Application approval form does not have a check 
mark in the box next to the statement "Individual not to return to work without further 
recommendation of Medical Division", he does not have to be examined by the Medical 
Bureau for fitness before he returns to teaching. The UFT responded that Freedman 
had not identified a vacant position to which he would be entitled to appointment by 
Board - U-20764 -4 
virtue of his seniority, that PERB's policy was against the reopening of improper 
practice charges, and that Freedman had presented no evidence that the settlement 
agreement had been repudiated by the District.4 The District's response to the 
exceptions argues that Freedman has failed to comply with the Rules of Procedure 
(Rules) requirements for exceptions5 and that, substantively, his arguments are without 
merit because it is Freedman who has failed to comply with the terms of the settlement 
agreement, i.e., he has failed to appear for the medical examination which is the 
prerequisite for his appointment to an appropriate vacant position.6 
) • — — — : •• 
4The UFT also argues in its response that Freedman has been returned to the 
District's payroll for the 1999-2000 school year and is currently assigned to Community 
School District No. 10 awaiting assignment to an available elementary position. As this 
fact was not before the Director when he denied the motion to reopen, we may not 
consider it. Margolin v.. PERB, 130 A.D.2d 312, 20 PERB U7018 (3d Dep't 1987), 
appeal dismissed, 71 N.Y.2d 844, 21 PERB 1J7005 (1988). 
5Freedman's exceptions are in the form of a letter and, while technically not in 
compliance with §213.2 of our Rules, they are sufficiently clear to indicate his 
objections to the Director's decision and the reasons therefor. See New York State 
Canal Corp., 30 PERBJ3070 (1997); Uniondale Union Free Sch. Dist, 27 PERB 1J3077 
(1994). As conceded by the District, we do offer some latitude to pro se litigants in their 
pleadings. See Transport Workers Union of Greater New York, 32 PERB 1J3004 (1999). 
6Although Freedman thereafter moved, on October 2,1999, for reconsideration 
by the Director of the denial of his motion to reopen, his motion for reconsideration is 
more appropriately considered as a reply to the UFT's and the District's response to his 
exceptions. Section 213.3 of our Rules precludes the filing of any pleading other than 
exceptions, cross-exceptions or a response to either exceptions or cross-exceptions, 
unless requested or authorized by this Board. Freedman's October 2 reply was neither 
requested nor authorized by the Board, therefore, it will not be considered. See also 
-
J
 United Fed'n of Teachers, Local 2 (Moore), 29 PERB 1J3025 (1996). 
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In State of New York (State University of New York-College at Potsdam), 
22 PERB 1J3045, at 3103 (1989), we set forth the standard for reopening a charge, as 
follows: 
In our view, settlement agreements reached between the 
parties in resolution of improper practice charges should not 
be set aside and the charges reopened except in the same 
extraordinary circumstances which would establish a 
repudiation of the settlement agreement, as we have 
defined repudiation in our review of our analysis of our 
jurisdiction under §205.5(d) of the A c t . . . . [A] mere 
difference between the parties . . . concerning the extent to 
which compliance has been achieved is insufficient to 
warrant the reopening of a settled improper practice charge. 
It is only under circumstances in which there is no colorable 
claim of compliance with the settlement agreement or in 
which it can be shown that the noncomplying party has 
otherwise repudiated the agreement that a charge will be 
reopened. A difference of opinion concerning whether, and 
the extent to which, compliance with a settlement agreement 
has taken place is a matter for enforcement procedures in 
another forum. 
Here, air that was presented to the Director was Freedman's argument that he 
has complied with the requirements for reappointment as set forth in the settlement 
agreement, the District's argument that Freedman has not yet complied with the 
requirements of the agreement which would trigger the District's obligation to appoint 
him to a vacant position, and the UFT's argument that Freedman has not identified any 
appropriate position for which he is eligible. The Director correctly found that all that 
was presented to him in Freedman's motion to reopen was a difference of opinion 
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about compliance with certain provisions of the settlement agreement, a dispute which 
is beyond PERB's jurisdiction to hear.7 
Based on the foregoing, the exceptions are denied and the Director's decision is 
affirmed. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the motion to reopen the charge must be, 
and it hereby is, denied. 
DATED: January 24, 2000 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
Marc A. Abbott, Member 
/ ! 
%<Cll 
/ John T. Mitchell, Member 
7
 See United Fed'n of Teachers (Fearon), 33 PERB 1J3003 (January 24, 2000). 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
PUTNAM COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE 
MANAGERS ASSOCIATION, 
Petitioner, 
- and - CASE NO. C-4609 
COUNTY OF PUTNAM, 
Employer, 
- and -
SHERIFF OF THE COUNTY OF PUTNAM, 
Intervenor. 
GERALD P. BUTLER, for Petitioner 
DONOGHUE, THOMAS, AUSLANDER & DROHAN (JOHN M= DONOGHUE 
and STUART S. WAXMAN of counsel), for Employer 
DECATALDO AND DECATALDO (ROBERT T. DECATALDO of counsel), for 
Intervenor 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on exceptions filed by the Sheriff of the County of 
Putnam (Sheriff), and on the exceptions and cross-exceptions filed by the County of 
Putnam (County) concerning two decisions issued by the Director of Public 
Employment Practices and Representation (Director) in a representation proceeding 
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brought by the Putnam County Sheriff's Office Managers Association (Association). 
The Sheriff filed a reply to the County's cross-exceptions, and each filed a supporting : 
brief. The Association filed no exceptions or other papers in this appeal. 
There are two issues presented to us. The first is whether the Director correctly 
determined that the County is the sole employer of employees in the County's Sheriff's. 
Department, as the County contends, or whether the County and the Sheriff jointly • 
employ those employees, as the Sheriff contends. The second issue is whether the 
Director correctly determined that certain employees holding titles in the Sheriff's 
Department are entitled to be represented by the Association. The County argues that; 
the Director erred in concluding that all but two of the at-issue employees are not 
managerial. The Sheriff has taken no position concerning the Director's uniting 
determination. 
PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
On November 19, 1996, the Association filed a petition seeking to be certified as 
the exclusive bargaining agent for a unit of unrepresented lieutenants, captains, and a :• 
chief criminal investigator, employed by the "Putnam County Office of the Sheriff." The; 
County filed a response claiming that it is the sole employer of the at-issue employees 
and that they are not entitled to representational rights because they are managerial 
under §201.7 (a) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act or Taylor Law).1 
1The County also alleged that the proposed unit is not appropriate because the . 
employees do not share a sufficient community of interests. However, it later 
abandoned that position. 
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The Sheriff also filed a response claiming that he and the County jointly employ the 
employees and that the unit is appropriate. 
In an interim decision dated September 1,1997, the Director determined that the 
County is the sole employer of the at-issue employees.2 The County and the Sheriff 
filed exceptions, but, because the proceeding had not run its course, we declined to 
consider them.3 Instead, we remanded the matter to the Director to consider the uniting 
issues raised by the County. In our view, if the employees were managerial, as the 
County argued, then the nature and identity of the employer would be moot. 
On remand, the Director determined that two of the employees are managerial, 
but that the rest are not.4 Therefore, he directed that there be a unit of employees 
holding the titles road patrol, corrections and communications captains, and corrections 
lieutenants. He gave the Association fifteen days to provide evidence of majority 
support, or he would conduct an election. 
In this appeal, the Sheriff again argues that the Director erred in concluding that 
the County is the sole employer. The County argues that the Director was correct in 
that regard, but that he erred in finding that all but two of the employees are not 
managerial. 
230PERB 1J4037 (1997). 
331 PERB H3031 (1998). 
432PERB H4020(1999). 
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DISCUSSION 
Because we affirm the Director's uniting determination, we first address the more 
important aspect of this case - whether an elected sheriff and a county are joint 
employers under the Act. 
In finding that the County is the sole employer, the Director held that the 
historical basis for the joint employer relationship between a sheriff and a county no 
longer exists. The effect of that determination is to relieve elected sheriffs of their right 
and duty to negotiate under the Act, and it could elicit petitions to consolidate some or 
all of the titles in existing sheriffs department units with county-wide units, often the 
very units from which they were fragmented in the first place. As discussed below, we 
reverse. 
Public employers are required to negotiate and to enter written agreements with 
recognized or certified employee organizations concerning represented employees' 
wages, hours, arid other terms and conditions of employment.5 The duty to negotiate 
and to enter such agreements on behalf of a public employer falls to the employer's 
chief executive officer,6 and those agreements are binding on the employer except as to 
terms that require approval by the employer's legislative body.7 Therefore, among the 
criteria that we must apply in fashioning the most appropriate bargaining unit under 
5Act §§200, 204. 
6Act §201.12. 
7Act §204-a. 
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§207.1 is that: 
(b) the officials of government at the level of the unit shall 
have the power to agree, or to make effective 
recommendations to other administrative authority or the 
legislative body with respect to, the terms and conditions of 
employment upon which the employees desire to negotiate.8 
Necessarily, the officials of government to which §207.1 (b) refers are, or are acting on 
behalf of, the employer's chief executive officer. 
The primary significance of a joint employer relationship under the Act is that it 
implicates §207.1 (b). Unless there are common officials of both employers at the level 
of the unit who can enter binding agreements concerning all of the unit employees' 
terms and conditions of employment, that criterion can never be satisfied, and the unit 
is not the most appropriate.9 Simply put, only where §207.1(b) is satisfied can there be 
effective negotiations. Anything less defeats the policies underlying the Act. 
It is of no moment that the chief executive officer of one employer has 
acquiesced to agreements negotiated by the chief executive officer of the other.10 At 
best, such acquiescence establishes that the latter served as the bargaining agent for 
8Act, §207.1 (b). 
9County of Clinton and Sheriff of County of Clinton, 18 PERB 1J3070 (1985). 
10See County of Jefferson and Jefferson County Community College, 26 PERB 
1J3010, at 3018 (1993), conf'd sub nom. Jefferson County v. PERB, 204 A.D.2d 1001, 
27 PERB 1J7010 (4th Dep't), leave to appeal denied, 84 N.Y.2d 804, 27 PERB 1J7014 
(1994). In finding that it is the possession of power to determine terms and conditions 
of employment, and not the exercise of that power that is material, the Board implicitly 
adopted the same view articulated by the dissent in Town ofRamapo, 8 PERB 1J3057, 
at 3105 (1975). 
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the former.11 Where, however, there is a common official of both employers at the level 
of the unit who can enter binding agreements on behalf of each, §207.1 (b) is satisfied.12 
Only where §207.1 (b) has been satisfied, may the criteria provided in. §201.7(a) and (c) 
be considered and, as appropriate, balanced.13 
In County of Ulster and Ulster County Sheriff,™ the Board first determined that an 
elected sheriff and a county are joint employers and that a separate bargaining unit of 
sheriff's department employees was most appropriate. While noting that an elected 
sheriffs powers can be effected by local law to the extent authorized by the Municipal 
Home Rule Law, the Board observed: 
The sheriff is responsible for appointing his deputies and 
they serve at his pleasure. This authority is derived from 
State Law and is not a delegation from the county. The 
same is true of the authority of the sheriff to assign job 
duties and other responsibilities to his deputies, promote 
them, lay them off, determine their work schedules, and 
approve time for vacation, holiday and overtime work. The 
Sheriff alone is responsible for the discipline and training of 
his deputies and has the sole authority to hear and resolve 
11
 See, e.g., William B. Martin, Sheriff of Ulster County, 6 PERB 1J3084 (1973); 
County of Jefferson and Jefferson County Community College, supra note 10. 
12See, e.g., Town of North Castle, 19 PERB ff3025 (1986), where the chief 
executive officer of one employer was, as a matter of law, the chief executive officer of 
the other. There, however, the other employers, water districts, did not have any 
influence over employees' terms and conditions of employment. 
13See County of Erie and Sheriff of Erie County, 29 PERB p 0 3 1 (1996), conf'd 
247 A.D.2d 671, 31 PERB 1J7004 (3d Dep't 1998) (separate bargaining units for road 
patrol and corrections officers most appropriate under §207.1 (a)). 
143 PERB lf3032 (1970), conf'd sub nom. County of Ulster and Ulster County 
Sheriffs Office v. CSEA, 37 A.D.2d 437, 4 PERB ^7015 (3d Dep't 1971). 
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their grievances.15 
However, the county controlled the economic terms and conditions of employment for 
sheriff's department employees. According to the majority in County of Ulster, that 
shared control over all of the essential subjects to be negotiated dictated that the 
county and the sheriff participate in collective bargaining with a separate unit of sheriff's 
department employees as "joint employers."16 Although the Board did not specifically 
discuss §207.1 (b), we view that decision to have been designed to accommodate that 
statutory criterion. 
In County of Nassau and Nassau County Sheriff,^7 the Board had occasion to 
reexamine the concept of a joint employer relationship as it applies to an appointed 
sheriff. There, the Board concluded that an appointed sheriff is essentially a 
department head, with no independent status as a joint employer. As we noted in 
remanding this matter to the Director, that decision may not have any dispositive impact 
on the status of an elected sheriff. We now take the opportunity to consider the 
reasoning underlying Nassau County as it applies to an elected sheriff. 
The office of sheriff is an instrumentality of government that exercises 
153 PERB 1J3032, at 3529. 
16The dissent in County of Ulster opined that the sheriff is the sole employer, 
despite the fact that the county controlled the employees' economic terms and 
conditions of employment. 
'25 PERB H3036(1992).. 
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governmental powers under the laws of the state,18 whether or not the official holding 
that office is elected.19 Therefore, although the government of which the office of sheriff 
is an instrumentality is the county, it meets the technical definition of public employer 
under the Act.20 But, as the Board noted in Nassau County, the mere fact that a person 
or entity is a public employer establishes only that it is subject to the Act.21 It does not 
impose any bargaining obligations22 and, therefore, it does not dictate any uniting 
results under §207.1 (b). 
However, unlike other instrumentalities of government, the office of Sheriff of 
Putnam County is an elective office under Article XIII, §13, of the State Constitution. In 
contrast to an appointed sheriff, who serves at the pleasure of the county executive 
) who appointed him, the Sheriff can only be removed from office by the Governor.23 
There is no higher executive office or official in the County to which the Sheriff is 
18See, e.g., County Law §650 (sheriff is the conservator of the peace); Correction 
Law §§500-a, 500-c (sheriff operates the county jail); CPLR Article 51 (sheriff is the 
enforcement officer for court orders); Judiciary Law Article 13 (sheriff provides court 
security); General Municipal Law §71 (sheriff to take all lawful means to protect persons 
or property threatened by mob or riot). 
19See County of Nassau and Nassau County Sheriff, supra note 17. 
20Act 201.6. 
21
 County of Nassau and Nassau County Sheriff, supra, n. 19. 
22See, e.g., Hudson Valley Dist. Council of Carpenters v. State of New York, 
Dep't of Correctional Sen/., 152 A.D.2d 105, 23 PERB 1J7514 (3d Dep't 1989). 
23N.Y.S. Constitution, Article XIII, §13. However, the office itself can be 
abolished by the County legislature if approved by referendum. Westchester County 
CSEA v. DelBello, 70 A.D.2d 604 (2d Dep't), rev'd, 47 N.Y.2d 886 (1979). 
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accountable. Therefore, the Sheriff is the chief executive officer of the Sheriff's 
Department. Consistent with that status, and like the sheriff in Ulster County, the 
Sheriff's duties and powers under the County Law can only be altered by local 
legislation, to the extent authorized under the Municipal Home Rule Law. 
In addition to being the chief executive officer of the Sheriffs Department, as in 
Ulster County, the Sheriff wields executive control over significant noneconomic terms 
and conditions of employment flowing from his powers under the County Law. Those 
powers include the power to hire and fire employees, who serve at his pleasure.24 
Moreover, inherent to his statutory duties,25 the Sheriff has the power to direct his 
employees and to determine their day-to-day working conditions. 
In finding that the County is the sole employer for the at-issue employees, the 
Director relied on the effect that a recent amendment to Article XIII, §13, of the State 
Constitution had on sheriffs. That amendment, effective January 1, 1990, deleted from 
Article XIII, §13, the sentence: "But the county shall never be made responsible for the 
acts of the sheriff." Prior to the amendment, a sheriff was personally liable for the 
misdeeds of the department's civil deputies. In Nassau County, upon which the 
Director relied here, the Board held:26 
A sheriff was liable for the negligence or misconduct of his 
deputies, any of whose duties related to civil matters, 
24County Law §652. 
25See supra note 18. 
2625 PERB H3036, at 3075. 
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[footnote omitted] even when those civil duties were 
arguably slight and incidental to criminal duties, [footnote 
omitted] Because of this liability, a sheriff was generally 
permitted to hire and fire deputies, without benefit or 
restriction of any civil service requirements, [footnote 
omitted] The sheriffs control over certain aspects of the 
deputies' employment relationship stemmed from this 
centuries-old imposition of vicarious liability. Construing 
Ulster not long after it was issued, the Board stated that a 
joint employer relationship was found in that case because 
"the Sheriff was responsible for appointing his deputies, who 
served at his pleasure, while the County controlled 
appropriations covering benefits sought by the deputy 
sheriffs." [footnote omitted] 
It is our opinion that this uniqueness of a sheriffs office, which is 
the primary underpinning for a joint employer relationship between 
a county and sheriff, has been removed by a recent change in the 
State Constitution, at least insofar as an appointive sheriff is 
concerned, [footnote omitted] 
Therefore, the Board concluded there that an appointed sheriff is not a joint employer 
with the county, but that the county is the sole employer of sheriffs department 
employees. 
We agree with that Board's determination that a county is the sole employer of 
employees of a sheriff who is appointed by superior executive county officials. We also 
agree that sheriffs' vicarious liability was the underpinning for the unfettered discretion 
that sheriffs had in hiring and firing civil deputies under the County Law.27 We disagree', 
however, with the prior Board's determination that that vicarious liability was also the 
underpinning for the joint employer relationship found in Ulster County. In fact, the 
majority in Ulster County specifically found that the sheriffs liability was immaterial to a 
See Flaherty v. Milliken, 193 N.Y. 564 (1908) 
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uniting determination under the Act,28 and, in confirming the majority's decision, Justice 
Simons, then writing for the Appellate Division, Third Department, specifically agreed.29 
We find that the existence or nonexistence of a sheriff's vicarious liability for the 
misdeeds of his or her employees is no more material in fashioning the most 
appropriate bargaining unit now. Indeed, the amendment to Article XIII, §13, does not 
automatically relieve sheriffs of that liability.30 
Likewise, we do not consider it material that civil deputies are now included in 
the classified civil service as a result of the amendment.31 That fact does not extinguish 
a sheriff's power to hire and fire employees, who continue to serve at his pleasure 
under the County Law.32 It simply limits the field of candidates from which he may 
select and promote employees, and the conditions under which he may discipline and 
dismiss them. Indeed, sheriffs have always been so constrained with respect to 
deputies engaged in law enforcement and they were even potentially so constrained 
with respect to civil deputies.33 
In our view, the material distinction between this case and Nassau County is that 
283 PERB 1J3032, at 3528 (1970). 
29County of Ulster and Ulster County Sheriff's Office v. CSEA, supra note 14, at 
7101. 
30See Santiamagro v. County of Orange, 226 A.D.2d 359 (2d Dep't 1996). 
31
 See Thoubboron v. N.Y.S. Dep't. of Civil Serv., 79 N.Y.2d 982 (1992). 
32See McMahon v. Michaelian, 38 A.D.2d 60 (2d Dep't 1971). 
33ld. 
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the sheriff in Nassau County, as an appointee of the county executive, is not a chief 
executive officer of an instrumentality of government. Although his powers and duties 
are the same as those of an elected sheriff, an appointed sheriff serves at the pleasure 
of the county executive who appointed him. Like any other department head, an 
appointed sheriff who declines to exercise his powers as the county executive sees fit 
can expect a brief term in office, assuming he or she is hired at all. Thus, as the Board 
found in Nassau County:34 
[A]n appointive sheriff, for purposes of the Act, is no 
differently situated as a matter of law than the many different 
officials of state and local government who carry out 
statutory mandates of various types, none of whom have 
been identified as independent public employers or have 
been made part of a joint employer relationship, [footnote 
omitted] 
In contrast, because an elected sheriff does not hold office as an appointee of higher 
executive officials, he is not a department head. He is a chief executive officer who, 
like an elected county executive, is accountable oniy to the county legislature and the 
citizens of the county. 
Therefore, we reaffirm the long line of Board decisions holding that the uniting 
criteria set forth in §207.1 (b) requires that an elected sheriff, as the chief executive 
officer of an instrumentality of government who wields ultimate executive control over 
significant noneconomic terms and conditions of employment, must participate in 
34Supra, note 17, at 3075. However, Nassau County should not be read to mean 
that employees of an appointed sheriff must be placed in a county-wide collective 
bargaining unit. Such a uniting determination requires our traditional analysis under 
§207.1(a) and (c). 
Board - C-4609 - -13 
collective bargaining as a joint employer with the county that controls the employees' 
economic terms and conditions of employment. Only then can the policies of the Act be 
effectuated through meaningful negotiations. In our view, the amendment to Article 
XIII, §13, of the State Constitution and the concomitant inclusion of civil deputies in the 
classified civil service do not warrant a contrary result.35 Contrary to the County's 
argument to us, we find it similarly immaterial that the State Legislature declined to act 
on a bill that would have amended the Taylor Law by making elected sheriffs and 
counties joint employers.36 
We now turn to the Director's uniting determination. We first note that there is no 
dispute that if the at-issue employees are not managerial, as the Director found* then 
they are appropriately included in a separate unit of Sheriffs Department employees. 
The only question before us is whether the employees are managerial. 
The County argues that the Director failed to consider the civil service job 
descriptions applicable to the employees, and that his summary of their duties was 
incomplete. However, having reviewed the entire stipulated record, we find that the at-
issue employees' tasks and responsibilities support the Director's determination for the 
reasons stated in his decision. We disagree with the County's assertion that the duties 
not specifically described by the Director merit a contrary conclusion. Indeed, the 
record overwhelmingly establishes that these employees are high-level supervisors akin 
35ln so finding, we note, but do not adopt, the former Director's decision in Essex 
County and Essex County Sheriff, 29 PERB 1J4002 (1996). 
Assembly bill A05910; Senate bill S04900. 
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to the clerks of the Court of Appeals and the Appellate Division, First and Second 
Departments, in State of New York - Unified Court System,37 who, we held, are not 
managerial or confidential despite their role in personnel and policy-making 
determinations. The bare fact, emphasized by the County, that some of these high-
level supervisors have the power to hire and fire part-time employees does not, in our 
view, evince the sort of conflicts of interest designed to be minimized by designations 
as managerial. Nor does the fact that some of the employees write and implement 
personnel policies. Such duties are common to high-level supervisors,38 but do not 
warrant the deprivation of representational rights associated with a designation as 
managerial.39 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the County's exceptions and cross-
exceptions are denied.and that the Sheriff's exceptions are granted. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the matter be, and hereby is, remanded to the 
Director for proceedings to determine whether a majority of the employees in the 
3730 PERB 1J3067 (1997), conf'd sub nom. Lippman v. PERB, _ A.D.2d _, 32 
PERB lf7017 (3d Dep't 1999). 
38See, e.g., Uniondale Union Free Sch. Dist, 20 PERB 1J3027 (1987), rev'd and 
remanded on other grounds, 140 A.D.2d 612, 21 PERB 1J7012 (2d Dep't 1988), on 
remand, 21 PERB 1J3060 (1988); Metropolitan Suburban Bus Auth. v. PERB, 48 A.D.2d 
206, 8 PERB U7009 (3d Dep't 1975), conf'g 7 PERB ^3025 (1974). 
See, e.g., Watervliet Housing Auth., 18 PERB 1J3079 (1985). 
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bargaining unit that the Director found to be most appropriate desire to be represented 
by the Association. 
DATED: January 24, 2000 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
arc A. Abbott, Member 
\k<r^ 
John T. Mitchell, Member 
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BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on exceptions filed by the Owego-Apalachin 
Administrators' and Supervisors' Association (Association) to the Administrative Law 
Judge's (ALJ) decision on its petition for unit placement filed pursuant to §201.2(b) of 
PERB's Rules of Procedure (Rules). 
The Owego-Apalachin Central School District (District) created the position of 
Administrative Assistant on September 24,1998. The District considered this position 
managerial/confidential. On November 8, 1998, the Association filed a petition for unit 
placement seeking to place the Administrative Assistant title in the unit of administrative 
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and supervisory personnel which it currently represents. The District objected to the 
proposed placement and a hearing took place on April 27, 1999. 
The Association has filed exceptions to the ALJ's decision dismissing the 
Association's petition. The Association argues, inter alia, that the ALJ "failed to 
consider the record as a whole" in making his decision. 
We disagree. After reviewing the record and considering the parties' arguments, 
we affirm the ALJ's decision. The record supports the ALJ's decision that the 
Administrative Assistant title should not be placed in the Association's bargaining unit. 
We have long held that an employee's status as either managerial or confidential 
may be considered in a proceeding brought by a party other than the employer.1 This 
'\ matter comes to us on a unit placement petition filed by the Association. The District 
objected on the grounds that the at-issue title should be outside the bargaining unit 
because of the duties relating to collective bargaining negotiations connected with the 
Administrative Assistant's position. The District considered this position managerial.2 
We have seen an evolution in the treatment of managerial employees. The 
language of the current statute defines who may be designated "from time to time as 
'McGraw Cent. Sch. Dist, 21 PERB P001 (1988), aff'g 20 PERB 1J4073 (1987), 
where the Board dismissed a representation petition based on the Director's decision 
that the employees at issue were managerial. 
2The District not having filed an application pursuant to the Act and §201.10 of 
the Rules of Procedure precludes us from making a designation of this title as either 
managerial or confidential. 
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managerial . . . upon application of the public employer to the appropriate board . . . ."3 
Any doubt as to the managerial status of an employee must be decided in favor of 
coverage by the Act. The statutory criteria have been applied conservatively in order to 
:
 prevent an employee from being denied collective bargaining rights based on 
speculation.4 
The statute5 is quite specific regarding the criteria for managerial designation. ' 
There are only two alternate standards. The employee must (1) formulate policy or 
(2) reasonably be required to assist directly in the preparation for and conduct of 
collective negotiations or to have a major role in the administration of collective 
agreements or personnel administration. We have determined that the bases for 
managerial designation are alternative and not cumulative. Consequently, it is not 
necessary to satisfy both standards in order to consider an employee managerial.6 
We note that in 1994, the Association filed a petition seeking to represent certain 
administrative employees and the District sought to exclude as managerial the Director 
of Education and the Director of Special Services. A hearing was held before the same 
ALJ as the instant proceeding. PERB's Director of Public Employment Practices and 
3Act§201(7)(a)(i)(ii). 
4City of Norwich, 28 PERB fl4078 (1995); Owego-Apalachin Cent. Sch. Dist, 28 
PERB 1J4011 (1995); DeRuyter Cent. Sch. Dist, 27 PERB fl4050 (1994). 
5Act§201(7)(a). 
6Greenburg Cent. Sch. Dist. No. 7, 20 PERB 1J3035 (1987). 
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Representation determined that both of the District's Directors should be included in the 
unit to be represented by the Association.7 
In 1998, the District reorganized its administrative structure and abolished the 
positions of Director of Education and Director of Special Services. The District 
replaced these titles with the Director of Instruction and Administrative Assistant. 
The Association, in its exceptions, principally argues that the record as a whole 
does not support ALJ Mayo's determination. We disagree. The District's Assistant 
Superintendent, Gerald Russell, was the first witness called by the Association. He 
testified that "at the time Mr. Comerford was hired there was an expectation that he 
would be actually involved in all phases of [collective bargaining] negotiations . . . ."8 
He was part of the negotiating team . . . ."9 "He [Comerford] would be involved with all 
the negotiations from the day he was hired . . . ." "It was a perfect time for 
training . . . ."10 "We were acting prospectively anticipating a future need for another 
negotiator."11 Russell "fully expected that Mr. Cornerford's role would increase as he 
gained more experience."12 
''Owego-Apalachin Cent. Sch. Dist., supra, note 4, before ALJ Gordon R. Mayo. 
8Tr. p. 53. 
9/d. p. 55. 
10/c/. p. 64. 
11/d. p. 65. 
nld. pp. 71-72. 
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In addition, the Association argues that the ALJ failed to follow prior PERB 
decisions regarding unit placement and as such violated the rule of stare decisis. In 
support of this position, the Association relies upon, among others, our decisions in 
Town ofDewitf3 and City of North Tonawanda}6" The Association's reliance upon 
these decisions is misplaced. Dewitt dealt with the designation of an employee as 
confidential and North Tonawanda is also distinguishable on its facts. The employer in 
North Tonawanda failed to produce sufficient evidence for the Director to designate 
certain employees managerial or confidential. Consequently, the Director found that 
unit placement was appropriate. 
We have previously held school district Administrative Assistants to be 
managerial employees excluded from all units when we have found that their duties 
involved administering labor agreements or the conduct of negotiations for the district.15 
As we have stated and, as noted by the ALJ, the record is clear that the Administrative 
Assistant, Thomas Cornerford, had been involved in collective bargaining issues even 
though negotiations over successor agreements had not yet begun.16 Furthermore, the 
1332 PERB 1J3001 (1999). 
1431 PERB 1J4029 (1998). 
'
5Frewsburg Cent. Sch. Dist, 17 PERB 1J3074 (1983); Whitesboro Cent. Sch. 
Dist, 12 PERB H3111 (1979). 
^Jamestown Professional Firefighters Ass'n., Local 1772, AFL-CIO v. Newman, 
19 PERB H3019 (1986), conf'd, 126 A.D.2d 826, 518 N.Y.S.2d 318, 20 PERB 1J7004 
(3d Dep't 1987). See City ofNewburgh, 16 PERB fl3053 (1983), where we held that an 
employee may be designated "managerial" on the basis of services that may 
reasonably be required of him in the future, while an employee may be designated 
"confidential" only on the basis of services already performed. Citing City of 
Binghamton, 12 PERB 1J3099 (1979). 
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job description for Administrative Assistant includes "[service] on the District's 
negotiation team for negotiations with all employee bargaining units; [assisting] the 
Assistant Superintendent in the development of negotiation positions; [assisting] the 
Assistant Superintendent in the development of negotiation proposals."17 
The record clearly demonstrates that Comerford was hired to succeed Russell as 
negotiator and, in the interim, he was being trained in the art of collective bargaining. 
He also directly participated in the limited amount of negotiations that were ongoing 
prior to the opening of negotiations for successor agreements. Under the 
circumstances, this activity is sufficient to meet our standard.18 The exceptions are, 
therefore, dismissed in their entirety. 
We accordingly affirm the decision of the ALJ that the title of Administrative 
Assistant is not appropriately included in the petitioner's unit. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the petition be, and it hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: January 24, 2000 ^ ^~s 
Albany, New York ^ • ^ y r 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
Binghamton, 12 PERB fl3099 (1979). 
17See District's Answer Ex. 4, flVll. Personnel Administration. 
^Clinton Community College, 31 PERB 1J3070 (1998); Greenburg Cent. Sen. 
Dist. No. 7, supra, note 6. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
LOCAL 342, UNITED MARINE DIVISION, ILA, 
AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-4925 
BOARD OF COOPERATIVE EDUCATIONAL 
SERVICES, COUNTY OF NASSAU, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
J 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that Local 342, United Marine Division, ILA, AFL-
CIO, has been designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the above-
named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as 
their exclusive representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and the 
settlement of grievances. 
^ 
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Included: Employees of the Department of Career Education employed as 
Adult Educators who work less than twenty (20), and a minimum of 
three (3) hours, or more of pupil contact hours per week. 
Excluded: All others. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with Local 342, United Marine Division, ILA, AFL-CIO. The duty to 
negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and 
confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of 
employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, 
and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if 
requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a 
proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: January 24, 2000 
Albany, New York 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-4936 
WEEDSPORT CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., 
Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO has been designated and selected by a majority of the 
employees of the above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties 
and described below, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
^ 
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Included: All regularly employed full and part-time bus drivers, teacher aides, 
custodians, building maintenance helpers and bus mechanic. 
Excluded: All other employees, including substitute and casual employees in 
the included titles above, and specifically excluding all 
administrators, head of transportation, head custodian, district 
office clericals, secretaries to school principals and nurses. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, 
AFSCME, AFL-CIO. The duty to negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to 
meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and 
other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any 
question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any 
agreement reached if requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel 
either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: January 24, 2000 
Albany, New York 
MichaelCR. Cuevas, Chairman 
7 /? //A /A am 
/ Marc A. Abbott, Member / 
John T. Mitchell, Member 
